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ONE OR MORE JUDGES IN THE COURTROOM? 
ADJUDICATION BY SINGLE JUDGES OR COLLEGIAL COURTS 
 
Reyer Baas, Leny de Groot-van Leeuwen & Miek Laemers* 
 
Abstract 
Until the eighties, judicial cases in the Netherlands have been largely considered by collegial 
courts consisting of three judges. Those days are gone. In this article is explained how the 
assignment of cases to either a collegial court or a single judge vary considerably, along with 
the arguments to choose for adjudication by a multi-judge or a single judge court. Judges are 
united on the merits of adjudication by three judges, particularly when it comes to quality. But 
do they acknowledge possible hazards attached to collegial decision making? 
 
Key words 
Adjudication, case assignment, judicial discretion, marginal judgment assessment. 
1. Introduction 
From the year 1811 onwards – when the Dutch judiciary was organized 
through a decree issued by the Emperor Napoleon – judicial decision making in 
the Netherlands was centred around collegial courts rather than single judges 
(unus iudices). The judges of the peace were an exception. Summary proceed-
ings, which require adjudication by one judge, did not occur frequently at the 
time. Because of growing delays in legal proceedings, the possibility of single 
judge adjudication in civil court proceedings was opened up in 1909. In the 
1920s single judges also appeared in juvenile courts and courts for minor 
criminal offences. The share of single judge decision making grew at a slow but 
persistent pace, until more than 80 percent of the criminal cases were decided 
by single judges in the 1980s. However, after decades of mainly efficiency 
oriented reform of the judiciary, recently the improvement of judicial quality 
has received much attention in the Netherlands. Measures to improve the qual-
ity of the courts include a shift away from single judge adjudication towards 
deliberative decision making in panels of three judges. 
Both inside and outside the judiciary it is wondered whether the quality has 
been under pressure of the present-day emphasis on efficiency. Common intui-
tion says that a panel of judges produces better results, because of the accu-
mulation of knowledge and visions, leading to more balanced opinions. The 
                                         
*  The authors are associated with the Administration of Law Research Programme of the 
Radboud University Nijmegen (the Netherlands), as PhD candidate, full professor and 
senior researcher, respectively. 
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dominant position of adjudication by single judges, being comparatively effi-
cient, would not always have been beneficial to the quality of adjudication, it is 
assumed. The major reason to opt for a single judge is saving in expenses. Is 
this presumption right? Overall, empirical research on this issue is very scarce 
indeed. It does not appear, for instance, in Kritzer’s overview of empirical re-
search and civil justice.1 According to Cross and Donelson, there is little scholar-
ship on how nations can improve their legal systems and create quality courts.2 
Against this background, the present article focuses on the issue of collegial 
and single judge adjudication, among others based on an empirical study of 
adjudication by one or more judges, which included interviews with and a ques-
tionnaire among judges and observation of court sessions in the Netherlands.3 
The authors interviewed 9 judges. The questionnaire was undertaken of 52 
managing judges of the various sectors of the courts of first instance and 17 
managing judges of the courts of appeal in the Netherlands. 
This article discusses current practices and judicial views on the issue. Cen-
tral questions are: (1) how the assignment of cases within the judiciary is dis-
tributed among collegial and single judge courts, (2) how single judge adjudi-
cation becomes to some extent collegial through the introduction of ‘marginal 
assessment’;4 (3) which development has taken place in this regard and which 
considerations and criteria played a part in the distribution of cases in the 
Netherlands during the past few years. These empirical questions engage sev-
eral theoretical themes on decision making, which will be discussed in the final 
section. 
2. Regulations on single or collegial courts 
At present, law prescribes that civil and administrative disputes are basically 
under the jurisdiction of single judge courts in the Netherlands. Criminal cases 
are, as a rule, tried in collegial courts. However, the law stipulates, a criminal 
case is subjected to the single-headed police court’s authority, when the case 
appears to be uncomplicated and the public prosecutor does not demand a 
sentence over one year of imprisonment. Subdistrict cases, among which of-
fences, claims up to 25,000 euro and labour and rental cases fall within the 
competence of the (single) cantonal judge. The legal starting point as regards 
appeals in civil, criminal and tax proceedings is adjudication in a collegial 
court. Several administrative courts of appeal, consisting mostly of three-judge 
                                         
1  Kritzer 2009a; Kritzer 2009b. 
2  Cross & Donelson 2010. 
3  This study resulted in a publication by Baas, De Groot-van Leeuwen and Laemers 
(2010). 
4  See section 5 of this article. 
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panels, are competent in judging on (various) cases of administrative law. The 
Supreme Court of the Netherlands is the competent authority for jurisdiction in 
cassation of civil, criminal and tax cases. Administration of justice by the Su-
preme Court occurs in panels of three or five justices. 
3. Case assignment in practice 
As seen, Dutch law merely sketches the outlines of case assignment to single 
judge courts or to collegial courts. As a result, courts have much discretion to 
enact their own policies. With the exception of cases of which the law defines 
that they ought to be considered in a collegial or single judge court, it is not 
determined beforehand whether and how a case is allocated to a three-judge 
panel or to one judge. The results of our questionnaire and the interviews show 
that the allocation of cases depends on substantive and functional criteria that 
have developed in practice. Complicated cases or cases that are likely to be 
exposed to much publicity are allocated to collegial courts. The education of 
sector starters5 can also play a part in the assignment of cases to a collegial 
court. Therefore so-called ‘education chambers’ are occasionally established, in 
which less experienced judges gain practical experience under the auspices of 
a practised chair. In exceptional circumstances, underperformance can give rise 
to deploy a particular judge (merely) in a collegial court. In courts of appeal, 
legal simplicity can give cause to allocate a case to a single judge court of ap-
peal. These criteria, mentioned by the respondents in the questionnaire and 
interviews, coincide to a large extent with the standards that the Dutch Council 
for the Judiciary proposed in 2007. The main criteria for assignment of a case 
to a particular judge, sitting in a single-judge formation, are expertise and ex-
perience. Personal preference of judges themselves is little put forward as a 
major criterion. 
Within a court, the practice of case assignment varies per court sector6 and 
so does the level of case allocators. Sometimes so-called ‘cause list judges’ ini-
tiate the actual case assignment; in other cases, this responsibility is in the hands 
of a judge acting as a team leader,7 an experienced court clerk or an adminis-
trative employee. Between the court sectors that concern the same field of law, 
some outlines about the case assignment can be distinguished. In the trade sec-
tors usually a cause list judge is responsible for the assignment of a case to a 
single judge court after the statement of defence. Subsequently the judge on 
                                         
5  A sector starter is a judge who has little judicial experience in the field of law concerned. 
6  A court sector is a sector in a court that is responsible for the adjudication of a case in a 
particular field of law (usually trade, family, crime and public administration). 
7  A cause list judge is a judge who manages the cause list and considers cause list sittings. 
A sector chair is a judge heading a court sector. A team leader is a judge heading a team 
or a division. 
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the case decides whether a session in court is required. In most of the family 
sectors, session schedules are drawn up in which sessions in court are planned 
for the various types of family cases. Just very few types of cases (such as dis-
franchisement of parental authority) are always considered in a collegial court. 
In the administrative sectors, cases are first prepared by administrative and 
legal employees, until they are ‘fit for a session in court’. After a preliminary 
investigation the administrative sectors follow various operating procedures. 
The criminal sectors apply an entirely different method than the other sectors. 
The public prosecutor goes through the criminal cases and indicates whether 
they are appropriate for treatment by a collegial or by a single judge court. 
He takes the allocation decisions on the basis of covenants, which are estab-
lished between the offices of the public prosecutor and the criminal court sec-
tors. In these covenants, rules of case assignment are agreed upon as well as 
the number of sessions in collegial and single judge courts. Eventually the crimi-
nal chamber that considers the case (a single judge or a collegial court) pre-
serves the right to refer a case to another (collegial or single judge) chamber. 
In the criminal sectors of the courts in appeal, the assignment is mostly per-
formed by either the sector chair or a ‘gate judge’.8 
4. Judicial discretion in case assignment 
Judicial discretion in the Netherlands 
The Dutch legislator leaves judges and courts much discretion in determining 
whether a case is best handled in a single or in a collegial court. However, if 
the law explicitly prescribes the number of judges in particular categories of 
cases, then violation of the provision leads to the annulment of the judgment.9 
The freedom that judges and courts enjoy in the assignment of cases is consis-
tent with the concept of judicial independence. This principle ensures that the 
independent judiciary – without interference from the legislative and executive 
power – decides how to organize the handling of cases. The Dutch court boards 
formally have the authority to create single judge chambers and collegial 
chambers. They also determine who of the judges in their court will try the 
cases that have come in. In practice, the allocation of cases is performed by the 
court sectors. Judicial independence not only guarantees that no other branches 
of government give instructions on how judges should settle a dispute, but also 
that judges who have been assigned a case, are independent in relation to 
                                         
8  A gate judge is a judge who considers the nature and size of incoming cases, after which 
he assigns them to a single or collegial court (whether or not specialized). 
9  Article 5 of the Dutch Act on Judicial Organization (in Dutch: Wet op de rechterlijke or-
ganisatie). 
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other judges in the exercise of their function, both with regard to the content of 
the decision as with regard to the manner of treatment. This means that judges 
who have been assigned a case, should not receive binding instructions from the 
board of the court or from fellow judges on the settlement of the case. The dis-
cretion courts enjoy in the choice for a single judge or a three-judge panel also 
takes shape in the judicial competence for referral of a case. A single judge is 
almost always authorized to refer a case to a collegial court, if he considers 
this court more appropriate for deciding on a case. Reversely, a collegial court 
is entitled to refer cases to a single judge court. In practice such referrals occur 
to only a very limited degree. 
Judicial discretion in other countries 
In comparison to other countries, the Dutch courts have large discretionary 
powers in assigning cases to either a single judge court or to a collegial court. 
Research on the allocation of cases within courts in six Western European coun-
tries shows that Dutch law heavily relies on internalized professional values of 
independence and impartiality. The same goes for the law in England and in 
Denmark, while in Germany and in Italy, courts have way less opportunity to 
decide autonomously whether a case should be handled by one judge or by a 
panel of judges. In France, rules of case assignment are more stringent too. In 
1975 the French Conseil Constitutionnel ruled that the decision to settle particu-
lar categories of cases by either a single judge court or a panel of judges 
should not be decided per case. In France, the principle of equality before the 
law prevents that citizens in similar circumstances are tried by courts that are 
composed under different rules.10 
Judicial agreements 
Although not entirely uncontroversial, the freedom of judges to consult one an-
other or even to enter into agreements about the disputes they have to settle, is 
also seen as falling within the scope of judicial discretion. Consultation and 
agreement of judges are not uncommon practices. For instance, Dutch cantonal 
judges have created and later revised the so-called ‘cantonal judge formula’ 
without being obliged by the law. This formula is a method of calculating the 
severance pay in individual labour disputes. In matters that have been agreed 
upon, it is more obvious to opt for single judge adjudication than in cases in 
which agreements or instructions are absent. Likewise, adjudication by one 
judge is reasonable in cases in which the interpretation of law and case law is 
steady and clear (clair or éclairé).  
                                         
10  Conseil Constitutionnel, Décision n° 75-56 DC du 23 juillet 1975, Journal officiel du 24 
juillet 1975, p. 7533. Recueil, p. 2. 
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Yet, the discretion to consult or to enter into agreements may raise ques-
tions on how this power is related to the principle of judicial independence. 
Judicial consultation may improve the unity of law and could increase the sup-
port for a policy, but it may conflict with the principle of judicial independence 
as well. This is not only applicable for decisions on substantive law, such as as-
sessing the penalty in criminal law and the determination of damage in civil 
law, but also in the field of procedural law. That does not mean that judicial 
consultation outside the hearing in chambers is not permissible. Judges in courts 
of last instance in particular have an interest in some kind of accordance of the 
course to be followed. 
However, in spite of the judicial freedom in the assignment and handling of 
cases, three requirements cannot be ignored. First, as mentioned before, al-
though Dutch courts have to a large extent discretionary power in the alloca-
tion of cases to a single judge or to a panel of judges, there are certain strict 
legal regulations on the number of judges that needs to consider the case as 
well. Court-cases in appeal, for instance, are handled by a forum consisting of 
three judges. Further, due to reasons of judicial independence and impartiality, 
it must be apparent which judges have decided on a case. Therefore each 
judgment mentions their names on pain of being null and void. Finally, individu-
als should rest assured that only these judges, and no other persons, have ren-
dered their judgment. With a view on these conditions, some respondents in the 
questionnaire show hesitations against the practice of judicial arguments, since 
this allows the involvement of other persons than the judge in the decision. 
There can yet be no doubt that merely the judge who has been assigned the 
case is the one who takes the final decision and bears full responsibility. 
5. The process of adjudicating single judge cases 
It shows from the previous that there is a wide variety of forms of adjudication 
in single judge and collegial courts in the Netherlands. The most frequent forms 
are pictured concisely in the figures 1 and 2. 
A case allocated to a single judge court is generally considered in a court 
session. A minority of cases (mainly petitions) are settled without a session. Save 
the situations in which the judge gives a ruling on the case immediately after 
the court session, which happens regularly in police court and subdistrict cases, 
the judge or the court clerk assisting the judge, writes a draft judgment. This 
draft is subsequently discussed by the judge and the clerk and decided by the 
judge. In some cases another person becomes involved in one of these proce-
dures: his task is to perform a so-called marginal assessment of the draft deci-
sion. 
Nijmegen Sociology of Law Working Papers Series: 2012/03 
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Marginal assessment of single judge judgments 
Marginal assessment of a draft judgment is performed by a judge or a senior 
court clerk. None of these officials have in any way been involved in the case 
before. Marginal assessment can be limited or comprehensive. The first amounts 
to a brief check on the presence of inaccuracies. The latter involves a close in-
vestigation on the consideration of relevant facts and on the proper application 
of the law. This type, which requires inspection of the case file, occurs less fre-
quent than a limited judicial one. The comprehensive procedure is prescribed 
by the Council for the Judiciary when the draft has been written by a judge-in-
training or a judge with little experience in the field of law he is working in. 
When the judge on the case has taken note of the comments of the judge or 
clerk who performs the marginal assessment, he processes them insofar he 
agrees, after which the final judgment is passed. 
Marginal assessment of draft judgments seems to be an undemanding 
method to improve a judgment’s quality. It can be organized rather easily and 
the chance for errors and inaccuracy is said to get smaller, when draft judg-
ments are read by a colleague before they become final. Nearly all respon-
dents in our research are favourably impressed by the effects of marginal 
assessment on the quality of a judgment. Nevertheless, this kind of assessment is 
not common practice yet. In courts of appeal, marginal assessment has not 
made headway at all, which is not surprising in view of the small share of cases 
heard by single judges in these courts. In the trade and administrative sectors, 
judgment assessment occurs more frequently than elsewhere. In the criminal sec-
tors, a minority of judges read the drafts written by a colleague. Two thirds of 
the respondents point out that all judgments drafted by sector starters are as-
sessed before they become final. In general, marginal assessment of draft 
judgments is the exception rather than the rule. 
In order to promote the practice of marginal assessment, the Dutch Council 
for the Judiciary has laid down norms.11 Judges in the courts of first instance 
are assumed to review one (draft) judgment per month. Sector starters should 
have a colleague assess all drafts during the first six to twelve months. 
The practices of adjudication by single judge courts, as mentioned by the 
respondents, appear as follows: 
  
                                         
11  The norms have been established by the Project Group Quality Norms 2007, pp. 13-14. 
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Figure 1- Adjudication in single judge courts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. The process of adjudicating collegial court cases 
A case assigned to a collegial court is generally the responsibility of three 
judges. However, their personal involvement in the procedure may vary consid-
erably, leading to a wide variety of practices. By way of example, it happens 
that one of the judges writes an opinion prior to the session in court, as a starter 
for discussion, or afterwards, leading up to a draft judgment. Sometimes a 
draft is devised after the session in court, but before the discussion among the 
judges in the collegial chamber. In other cases no draft is written until the de-
liberations are finished. Figure 2 presents a summary of the main forms of ad-
judication in collegial courts as reported by our respondents. 
Apart from the preparation to the court session, which primarily amounts to 
reading the case file, adjudication by a collegial court usually consists of three 
written draft judgment 
by the judge or  
a court clerk  
 
 
marginal assessment of draft 
judgment (possibly including 
the file) 
decision (judgment) 
court session 
 
 
case assignment 
 
 
to a single judge court 
 
 
to a three judge-panel 
(see figure 2) 
 
 
preparation  
(reading the case file) 
 
 
Nijmegen Sociology of Law Working Papers Series: 2012/03 
 
 
11 
 
stages: a court session and subsequent discussion (in the absence of any others 
than the judges and the court clerk), leading to the decision making by three 
judges in chambers. Although the judges are appointed to handle and decide 
on the case, experienced court clerks often fully participate in the decision 
making process. They lack the right to vote in hearings in chambers indeed, yet 
the effect of this is modest, since judges constantly aim at consensus and there-
fore rarely proceed to the vote. 
Even when a trade, family or administrative case has been assigned to a 
three-judge court, the hearing in court is often held in the presence of just one 
judge (see figure 2). Ensuing discussion and decision making is obviously carried 
out by three judges. The judges who were absent during the court session are 
informed about the ins and outs of the case by the (single) judge who has pre-
sided the session. 
It rather much depends on the kind of case whether it is adjudicated in a 
collegial court or by a single judge. In the period 2008-2011 approximately 5 
percent of the trade law cases (4.9 percent (in 2008) and 5.5 percent (in 
2011)) were decided by collegial courts. In family law, these figures vary from 
0.2 percent in 2008 to 1.4 in 2011. In criminal law, the years 2008-2011 
show an increase in the share of cases that were considered in a three-judge 
court: from 10.8 percent in 2008 to 13.8 in 2011. Likewise occurred with ad-
ministrative cases: from 8.9 percent in 2008 to 10.5 percent in 2011. In ap-
peal, nowadays a vast majority of cases are considered in collegial formation. 
The observed rise in the share of collegial decision making complies with 
the intention of the Dutch Council for the Judiciary to have more cases consid-
ered in a three-judge court. As a means to improve the quality of the jurisdic-
tion, the Council has laid down norms for the collegial adjudication in courts of 
first instance.12 In the trade sector, the norm for cases to be handled in collegial 
formation is 10 percent. Further, 3 percent of the family cases should be con-
sidered by a three-judge panel. The established norm in criminal cases is 15 
percent, for administrative cases it is 10 percent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                         
12   Council for the Judiciary 2012, p. 36. 
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Figure 2- Adjudication in collegial courts 
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One third of the respondents think the sessions in court and decision making 
should take place more often by panels of three judges instead of single 
judges. Although both adjudication in a collegial court and judicial assessment 
are appreciated, respondents regard the first as even more beneficial to qual-
ity. When asked which of these forms produces the best judgment, 23 out of 59 
respondents opt for judging in panels; 8 prefer judicial assessment. The others 
find both forms equally suitable or do not make a choice. The companionship 
resulting from working together is highly appreciated, although about half of 
the respondents consider adjudication in a collegial court as (very) pressing, 
apart from the severity or complexity of cases tried by collegial courts, which 
are generally more intense in comparison to cases brought before a single 
judge court. Perhaps these respondents experience more pressure due to being 
witness of each other’s performance. In the questionnaire it is emphatically re-
quested to just assess the relation between form of adjudication and pressure 
of work, but what may play a part is that cases in a collegial court are often 
more complex and sizeable than in single judge courts and hence bring about 
higher pressure. 
The bulk of the respondents’ arguments and considerations pro collegial 
courts also arise in literature and policy documents. It is generally assumed that 
groups make better decisions than individuals do. Social psychology learns that 
the difference in quality is especially prevalent in decisions on complex prob-
lems. Our respondents mirror these arguments very clearly. They explicate that 
panels of judges better enable the exchange of ideas and points of view, and 
broaden the basis in legal literature and case law, which results in more delib-
erate decisions. The literature also mentions that collegial decision making tends 
to prevent abuse of power, e.g. driven by personal dislikes of judges. This ar-
gument is not put forward by any of the respondents. 
As the flipside of the single/collegial coin, our respondents point out a 
number of advantages of adjudication by a single judge court as well. First of 
all, the efficiency argument is brought up: single judge decision making saves 
time and money. Second, adjudication by one judge may create a more infor-
mal atmosphere in court sessions, compared to sessions in which a full panel of 
judges is involved. Third, the organization of single judge adjudication is much 
easier. 
Some respondents argue that a ruling by one judge may be as good as 
one passed by a panel, when the judge on the case is an expert on the matter. 
Another argument put forward in favor of single judge adjudication is that by 
Baas et al.: One or More Judges in the Courtroom? 
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laying responsibility for both process and judgment on the shoulders of one 
judge, he is likely to decide in a more conscientious way.13 
Concerning the allocation of cases between single or collegial courts, both 
the respondents as well as scholars in administration of law argue that single 
judges are usually experienced and skilled. Accordingly, cases in single judge 
courts are, as a rule, not assigned to sector starters. Respondents and scholars 
also point to a hazard, namely that court boards may give in to the temptation 
to assign cases to a single judge court, not after reflection but under the influ-
ence of scarcity (in means and in manpower) or because they are faced with 
high demands of processing times – even when adjudication in a collegial court 
would be more appropriate from a quality point of view. Both respondents 
and scholars bring up the argument that if a single judge underperforms, the 
court in appeal has to repair the flaws. Some respondents mention that single 
judges may not always be able to cope with heavy cases (in terms of legal 
complexity, extensive fact-finding or emotional pressure) and feel lonesome by 
constantly settling cases all by themselves.14 
8. Discussion: Over-optimism? 
Reflection on the preference of single or collegial decision making is scarce in 
recent literature and in empirical studies. In this section theory and literature 
will be connected to two issues that emerged from our empirical study. These 
issues are: (1) if it is indeed agreed that collegial decision making is superior, 
why then are cases which are primarily allocated to single judges seldom re-
ferred to collegial courts, whereas judges are authorized to do so? (2) Is colle-
gial decision making indeed as superior as commonly assumed? These issues 
are connected through a single theme: over-optimism. This plays out as over-
optimism on one’s own capacity and over-optimism about collegial court qual-
ity. 
The single-or-group issue resonates with theories and literature on decision 
making in general, on judicial decision making and on separate opinions. Most 
theorists presume that judges pass rulings (single-handedly or after delibera-
tion in a panel of judges) without critically engaging the potentially deep dif-
                                         
13  Besides, some respondents raise that they, when acting as a single judge, are pleased to 
be solely responsible for a case and to be free to have their own approach. Further, a 
single judge’s ruling may show some more unity, as it does not need to contain a com-
promise between different views. The argument that an oral judgment (passed by a po-
lice court judge) better fits in with the suspect’s environment, is brought up in the ques-
tionnaire and interviews and is not confirmed in the literature. 
14  Respondents also comment on the financial aspects of the single/collegial issue, since 
court budgets in the Netherlands partially depend on the share of collegial court cases. 
Further, several judges mention the educational effects of collegial courts for inexperi-
enced colleagues; many express their pleasure in collective consideration of court cases. 
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ference between individual and group decision making.15 Psychological litera-
ture and research show, however, that certain mistakes in decision making are 
made unconsciously and in good faith again and again.16 In the first place 
people tend to seek information to support the views and opinions they al-
ready have and tend to ignore the information that undermines their views and 
opinions. This ‘belief perseverance’ makes that people look for verification in-
stead of falsification of their ideas.17 The implication for our issue could be 
that, because a single judge will simply more overlook his own mistakes, a 
panel of judges should be preferred, because such formation will have more 
possibilities to avoid belief perseverance. But we should not be too optimistic 
about this solution, for does idea enrichment and contradiction really occur in 
panels? How about the fact that in a deliberating group those with a minority 
position often silence themselves or have otherwise disproportionally little 
weight because of informational pressure and social influences?18 
The psychological literature on self-deception offers another perspective 
on the decision making process in general: we should not be too much convinced 
of human capacities of balanced, open reasoning. According to Messick and 
Bazerman the human mind ‘has an infinite, creative capacity to trick itself’.19 
Individuals are quite capable to confirm bias, even if they are aware of the 
hazard of confirmation bias. In relation to our subject, judges may prefer to 
handle a case as an unus iudex instead of being part of a three-judge panel, 
although they are not fully capable to do the case, because they simply over-
estimate themselves, for example in their capacity to handle statistical informa-
tion. This may explain that on the one hand judges in our study report that col-
legial decision making is beneficial to the quality of the judgment, whereas on 
the other hand cases are only very rarely referred from a single judge court to 
a panel of judges, although, as explained above, the law provides them ample 
opportunity to do so. This paradox seems not to be recognized by judges 
themselves. 
People (judges included) are ‘creative narrators of stories that tend to al-
low us to do what we want and that justify what we have done. We believe 
our stories and thus we believe that we are objective about ourselves.’20 There 
are many mechanisms that are helpful to keep up our neutral appearances. 
One of these is the induction that takes place by evaluating our past perform-
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ances. ‘If what we were doing in the past was OK and our current practice is 
almost identical, then it too must be OK.’21 
Attribution theory adds another twist here, asserting that success will usually 
be attributed to oneself and failures will mostly be attributed to others. Out of 
self interest, we may regard factors, such as institutional practices in the courts, 
as immutable. It can be pleasant to pretend to be less important than you know 
you really are, for example so as to believe that you do not have any discre-
tion or in order to believe that it is someone else’s problem; either because 
they are to blame or because the responsibility is someone else’s, not yours. In 
that way, the responsibility for the decision is removed to somebody else. 
Judges may well assume that, if something has gone wrong in the allocation of 
a case to a single judge or a panel of judges, this is due to some system failure 
and not their fault. So they would blame the judicial organization or politics 
and have the opinion that the system should take the responsibility, take meas-
ures and change the informal or formal rulings. Literature on decision making 
suggests that individuals may perceive that the situation at stake is an ethical 
dilemma, so that ethical principles need to be considered, or that the situation is 
a business problem, so that organizational goals are of the utmost impor-
tance.22 Putting the blame on the organization is one way of escape from re-
sponsibility. 
According to Cross, the influence of collegiality on judicial decision making 
has seen less empirical analysis than the impact of ideology. As far as it has 
been researched, it has been examined indirectly, often with the focus on judi-
cial dissent.23 In Dutch legal culture, outspoken criticism and opinions are hidden 
behind closed doors, most of the time. Dissenting opinions between judges are 
never published; the deliberations are confidential and judges are obliged to 
maintain secrecy on their deliberations. In the Netherlands, judges are obliged 
to speak in one voice. In order to reach a common decision, they need to dis-
cuss and compromise.24 
Some argue that the Dutch system should adopt separate opinions (either 
dissenting, either concurring opinions), so as to force judges to explain their 
judgments in public and to reveal the grounds for their (dis)agreement as ex-
plicit as possible.25 Scholars have divergent ideas on the value of separate 
opinions. Most judges do not like to dissent, according to Posner.26 The com-
parative study of judicial transparency and legitimacy by Lasser shows some-
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thing else. He argues that in France the judicial deliberations remain secret, so 
that judges in chambers feel free to voice their opinion, enabling a real debate 
on the cases. It seems that because of the secrecy of the hearing in chambers, 
all arguments and implications of possible judgments can be reflected upon. 
When considered like that, the competence of justices in the American Supreme 
Court to issue separate opinions may well obstruct the exchange of ideas. 
Judges surely do not always tell what they think. In the European Court of Jus-
tice, there is no record of separate opinions. The same argument as the one by 
Lasser on France has been put forward with regard to the European Court: ‘In 
the course of deliberations there is frequently particular dispute over questions 
that leave no trace in the reasoning of the judgment. As a general rule such 
questions are not overlooked, as some critics think, but reaching agreement on 
them is so difficult that the Court prefers not to mention them.’27 Edward states 
that ‘if there is a vote, this does not mean that, from then on, the majority alone 
determine the form and content of the judgment. The minority may be quite as 
active as the majority in testing the soundness of the legal reasoning in the 
draft. The minority may even suggest that the language of the draft be 
strengthened in order to make it clear what the Court has decided.’28 
In the Netherlands, as is the case in the United States, judges themselves 
engage in a continual quest to reduce conflict through holding conferences, 
have collegial consults, circulating draft opinions and memorandums and con-
ducting private meetings between individual judges or groups of judges.29 
Some years ago, a picture was sketched of Dutch courts as places where semi-
nars, workshops and courses follow in rapid procession.30 Among judges in 
general, there exists a huge pressure to socialize and to behave collegial. 
According to Sunstein and others, social pressures and informational influ-
ences help explain some otherwise puzzling findings about judicial voting of the 
federal courts of appeals in the United States. It turns out that like-minded 
judges end up with more extreme opinions after deliberation. On three-judge 
panels, Republican appointees predominantly show conservative voting pat-
terns when sitting with two other Republican appointees, whereas Democratic 
appointees mainly demonstrate liberal voting patterns when acting in court with 
two other Democratic appointees.31 The interesting point is that these opinions 
are more extreme than those of the same judges individually. This tendency is 
known as group polarization: people may adopt more radical views after dis-
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cussion than they had before the discussion began.32 We should therefore not 
be over-optimistic when it comes to the idea that panels are less susceptible to 
confirmation bias. Their views may harden in more extreme positions. 
9. Conclusion 
In the Netherlands, practices of allocating cases to either a collegial court or an 
unus iudex in courts of first instance vary considerably, along with the argu-
ments given for these decisions. Views of judges on the general merits of single 
and group decisions are much more equivocal, however. Over 90 percent of 
the judges in our questionnaire hold the opinion that collegial consideration of 
cases is (very) beneficial to the quality of the decisions, whereas a majority of 
judges acknowledge the efficiency of single judge courts, the more hands-on-
approach and informal atmosphere in single judge court sessions. 
Marginal assessment of draft judgments may to a certain extent compen-
sate for the lack of discussion in single judge courts, but when it comes to qual-
ity, judges prefer collegial decision making. One third of the respondents, es-
pecially criminal judges and family judges, feel that cases should be handled 
by panels of judges more often. In spite of that, referral of a case from a sin-
gle judge court to a collegial court is the exception rather than the rule. Once a 
case has been assigned to a single judge court or a collegial court, it remains 
under its responsibility. Nonetheless, respondents agree that not all cases need 
consideration by three judges. A large number of cases is regular and requires 
no discussion. In such cases, fast processing prevails. The essence is in good case 
assignment: cases that are complex, emotionally charged or that generate 
much publicity are better handled by a collegial court. 
Further, there are good arguments to let courts explain why they have cho-
sen for consideration of a case by one or more judges. That brings understand-
ing in judicial motives and generates empirical material for additional research 
on the question whether more or less is better. Because of the diverse effects of 
decision making by single judges and collegial courts, it is also recommended 
to develop a clear policy on the allocation of cases, so that each case can be 
assigned more considerately to either one judge, to one judge in addition to a 
marginal assessment procedure, or to a panel of judges. 
As discussed above, the views exposed by judges are based on received 
wisdom. Our ongoing research at the Radboud University Nijmegen will there-
fore focus less on views and more on evidence-based analysis. This entails, 
among others, observation of deliberation of judges in chambers, as well as 
comparison of cases decided by single judges and panels of judges, on criteria 
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such as formal logic in argumentation and the proper use of up-to-date case 
law. 
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